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GAME THEORY BEHAVES
DAVID SALLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Half a century ago, bargaining was central to the maturation of game
theory, a field that uses mathematical theories and laboratory experiments to
study strategic interaction. Traditionally, the analysis of what would happen
when two economic actors negotiated over a trade of their endowed goods had
yielded a plethora of potentially viable contracts.' John Nash attacked this
indeterminacy by making "certain idealizations" and employing mathematics
in order to obtain a single solution that determined "the amount of satisfaction
each individual should expect to get from the situation."2 His idealizations
assumed "that the two individuals are highly rational, that each can accurately
compare his desires for various things, that they are equal in bargaining skill,
and that each has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the other.",
3
Nash's beautiful bargaining solution can be easily expressed. First,
accurate comparison of desires allows each bargainer's preferences to be
represented by a utility function, u1 or u2, respectively. Second, each
bargainer has a threat point, the outcome if no deal occurs-in current
negotiation parlance, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, BATNAI
and BATNA 2. The solution to the negotiation is the contract that maximizes
the following multiplicative quantity:
(ul - BATNA 1) ' (u2 - BATNA2)
More importantly, Nash demonstrated that his idealizations could produce
a solution in not just the bargaining game, but all other games as well. 4 The
Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies in a two-player game that are the best
possible responses to each other. For example, there ik one Nash equilibrium
in the matching pennies game. Two players have a penny and must decide
Ph.D. University of Chicago; A.B. Harvard.
1. F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF
MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES (1881).
2. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
3. Id.
4. John Nash, Two Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953).
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which face to show. One player wins if the same face (head or tail) is shown;
the other wins if there is a mismatch. The stable pair of strategies consists of
each player flipping his or her coin so that the presented face is chosen
randomly. Given the other side's strategy of flipping, the best possible
response is to randomize between heads or tails. Nash's foundational result
was to prove that every game, without exception, has at least one equilibrium
pair of strategies.
Of course, Nash understood how important his idealized assumptions
were to his proof. With respect to whether his model matched the reality of
the bargaining game, he wrote, "the usual haggling process is based on
imperfect information, the hagglers trying to propagandize each other into
misconceptions of the utilities involved. Our assumption of complete
information makes such an attempt meaningless., 5 A greater part of the
history of game theory over the last half century involves the analysis of what
happens when these assumptions of perfection are relaxed, and the
comparison of the outcomes predicted by the formal models and those chosen
by players in real games. Much of the former development involves technical
advances and mathematical sophistications that are beyond our purview here.6
The second set of developments, however, is essential to our purpose as it has
demonstrated that accepted formal models often predicted "heads" when
players in the laboratory or market played "tails." Such mismatching was
disconcerting to members of a field who had empirical, scientific aspirations,
and it is this disconcert that has led to the rise of behavioral game theory.
The purpose of this essay is to review a pocketful of the new matches
between theory and reality that behavioral game theory has been responsible
for in the last decade, especially those concurrences that have relevance to
those who teach and study the bargaining game. One historical mismatch that
I assume most readers are familiar with occurred in the testing of the
prisoners' dilemma. 7 This game has served as an exemplar of the tension
between cooperation and competition, between self-interest and joint
maximization. Since this game and, to a lesser extent, the ultimatum game
have been widely discussed and employed in negotiation classrooms, I will
focus on games that are not as widely known and on newly identified motives
for cooperative or fair behavior.
5. Id. at 138.
6. COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC
INTERACTION (2003); DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991).
7. For a review of experimental results, see David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in
Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC. 58
(1995).
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II. NEW GAMES, NEW MOTIVES
A. Strategic Sophistication
One of the primary pieces of advice offered to negotiators is to prepare,
prepare, prepare, just like the Boy Scouts, only more. The negotiator is told to
consider not only her own interests and issues, but also those of her opponent.
Yet, there is a basic question that is almost never addressed: Should I prepare
for a prepared opponent or an unprepared opponent? This question and its
more complicated variants (prepare for a prepared opponent who knows I am
preparing?) involve the issue of strategic sophistication. A high degree of
strategic sophistication was inherent in Nash's idealizations: His equilibrium
arises from two very rational players who choose strategies that are
reciprocally the best responses to each other. However, if one player is
boundedly rational and not really thinking things through, the other's best
response to this naivete might be quite different from the Nash equilibrium
strategy.
A clever new guessing game that can diagnose strategic sophistication
was introduced in 1995.8 The standard numerical guessing game involves a
group of players trying to come closest to a target integer between zero and
one hundred that someone has picked. This someone might be, for example, a
third grade teacher deciding which student gets to take the class bunny home
and care for it over vacation week. Here, in Nagel's version, the target
number is generated by the players themselves-it is some positive fraction,
greater than zero and less than one, of the average of all of their guesses. The
person closest to this sheared mean wins a prize. Players need to anticipate
where the average guess will be and then adjust downward, a cognitive
process that depends on making some assumptions about the other players.
As a numerical example, suppose there are ten players whose guesses are
equally spaced between 0 and 90, i.e., 0, 10, 20, 30, etc. Suppose, also, that
the target is 1/2 of the mean. Then, the average guess is 45, the target is 221/2,
and the person who guessed 20 would win. Note that the person who guessed
90 is not even close. If you held everybody else's guesses fixed, then she
oruld much r-e, - to c.an.. her gess to 1 99 K -. +Ut p o
IIVVV, IitI person guesin t Ov
would like to slash her guess, and so on. It turns out that the only Nash
equilibrium consists of each player guessing 0.
Because of the structure of the game, a player's guess reveals how
8. Rosemarie Nagel, Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study, 85 AM. ECON.
REv. 1313 (1995).
9. The solution to the equation that sets one half of the new mean equal to her guess, x: 1/2
*(360+x)/10=x.
2004]
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sophisticated she believes the other players are. Assume, for the moment, that
all the players except for one are not even bothering to think through the
game. We can call them zero-step players because they refuse to enter into
the strategic domain, foregoing any consideration of what might be the best
move. If our tenth player was strategic, she would choose the best response to
her naYve co-participants. This one-step player would select 24,0 and would
win the game if her prediction about the other players comes true. A two-step
player would make a best response to opponents who are all one-step
players-a guess of 11.11 Three-step players would assume that all others are
two-step and would choose the corresponding strategy. The process continues
and converges on Nash's idealized players who are infinitely sophisticated
and choose 0. Note that this progression makes the number line diagnostic, as
only zero-step players will make guesses significantly greater than 25, one-
step players will be around 25, two-step players will cluster around 11, and
the like.
Experimental tests have revealed how far real players are from Nash's
archetypes: the strong majority of participants are either one-step or two-step
players. !2 The remainder are more likely to be zero-step than three-step or
more. Other games and experimental technologies have confirmed this
finding of modest strategic sophistication.' 3 The best place to be in these
games, all else being equal, is close to the two-step players, adjusting upward
if the game is complicated and more zero-step players are anticipated, or
downward if more two-step players are forecasted. In the example game
above, that position might be a guess of 13 or 14.
These behavioral game theory results provide a foundation for training in
negotiation. Many bargainers are one-step strategists, worried only about
their own interests and outcomes and incurious about those of the other side.
Much of the knowledge imparted in the classroom is designed to make
students be two-step strategists. The prescriptive rule is that you want to be
one degree more strategically sophisticated than your counterparts, for it can
be just as costly to over-think a negotiation as to under-think it (5 is as bad a
10. Because the nine zero-step players would be choosing randomly, the expected total of their
guesses is 450. The one-step player solves the following equation to determine her best guess, x: 1/2
*(450+x)/10=x.
11. The solution to 1/2 *(216+x)/l0 x.
12. Nagel, supra note 8; Teck-Hua Ho et al., Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in
Experimental "p-Beauty Contests," 88 AM. ECON. REV. 947 (1998).
13. Miguel Costa-Gomes et al., Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An
Experimental Study, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1193 (2003); T. Hedden and J. Zhang, What Do You Think I
Think You Think? Strategic Reasoning in Matrix Games, 85 COGNITION 1 (2002); Dale 0. Stahl &
Paul W. Wilson, On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 10
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 218 (1995).
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guess in the example game as 25 is). "Plan, plan, plan" may be too much;
"plan plus one" (i.e., go one step further than your opponent) may be just
right. In addition, there is a good chance that your counterpart is a one-step
player, and therefore, you will need to directly educate him or her about your
interests and issues. The counterpart's reticence and lack of inquiry may be
due to ineptitude rather than strategy.
B. Learning
As one might imagine, if these guessing games are repeated with the same
players, all the guesses drop pretty quickly to the Nash equilibria.1 4 Players
are effective and quick learners in this type of game, but there are others in
which the players never quite figure things out. Learning, both the speed and
process of knowledge acquisition and its strategic implementation, has been a
very active topic in game theory. Theories and experiments investigate
whether players use history to alter their assumptions about other players and
then optimally respond to these changed expectations, or use it simply to
mimic strategies that won in earlier rounds.' 5 Note that the first approach,
"fictitious play," takes more cognitive effort than the second, "reinforcement."
A hybrid model that allowed for both learning approaches, depending on the
characteristics of the individual and the game, was able to explain the
evolution of strategic choices by many players in a wide range of repeated
games. 16
This hybrid model was predictive in part because it allowed sophisticated
players to both learn and to anticipate that others were learning as well.' 7
Consider the guessing game for a last time, and suppose the target ( / of the
mean) for the first round turned out to be 13. Pure reinforcement learners
might choose 13, naive fictitious play learners would choose 6 or 7, but more
sophisticated learners would anticipate the learning of the other players and
adjust their strategy accordingly. Camerer writes, "[A]s players gain
experience with the game, the degree of sophistication rises-they learn that
others (like themselves) are learning.
' ' 8
14. Ho et al., supra note 12.
15. Y.W. Cheung and D. Friedman, Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some
Laboratory Results, 19 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 46 (1997); 1. Erev and A. Roth, Predicting How
People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mired-Strategy
Equilibria, 8 AM. ECON. REV. 848 (1998).
16. Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, Experience- Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal-
Form Games, 67 ECONOMETRICA 827 (1999).
17. Colin F. Camerer et al., Sophisticated Experience- Weighted Attraction Learning and
Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games, 104 J. ECON. THEORY 137 (2002).
18. Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Studies of Strategic Thinking in Games, 7 TRENDS
COGNITIVE Sci. 225, 225-31 (2003).
20041
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Negotiation scholars, because of their familiarity with the prisoners'
dilemma, are well versed in the effects of repetition on creating value and
encouraging cooperation. They are less attuned to the learning that takes
place across repetitions. On the experimental side, the reason for this is due to
the pools of the usual subjects-students enrolled in a negotiation class and
those from the larger campus. The former are rarely, if ever, confronted with
the same negotiation from an earlier week, and the latter are generally quite
inexperienced negotiators.
Negotiation should follow the lead of game theory and place learning near
the top of its research agenda. The relationship between learning and
complexity and the relative importance of reinforcement and fictitious play
lead to many fascinating questions that could be studied more rigorously:
* If a negotiator has success with a particular tactic, how likely is
she to use that tactic in the next negotiation? Conversely, if a
counterpart has succeeded with a tactic, under what conditions are
you likely to trot out the same tactic, or, go one step deeper and
introduce a counter-tactic?
• What is the most effective way to teach key principles such as
interest-based bargaining? Is there a path or process that is clearly
to be preferred? I know that I am always disappointed when my
negotiation students fail to craft a contingency contract for a
second time after having learned about them a few weeks earlier.
* Does the Nash bargaining solution appear more frequently when
negotiations are recurring?
* How much is experience worth? What is the return on the
investment of sending a neophyte negotiator to the bargaining
table?
C. Social Preferences
A basic principle of negotiation, one that is learned through both
reinforcement and the negative effects of its absence, is trust. The trust game
was developed in the last ten years and has been employed as another tool to
examine the factors of cooperation, reciprocity, fairness, and generosity that
the prisoners' dilemma and ultimatum games have traditionally illuminated. 19
The trust game is a two-person bargaining game that is played as follows:
Player P is given a certain amount of money, say, $10. P may give some
portion of the endowment to the other player, the receiver, R. Every dollar
19. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122
(1995).
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that P sends to R is doubled or tripled. R, then, makes another allocation
decision-how much of the newly augmented pot will be remanded to P.
(This basic game is varied by constraining the options for the amounts offered
to R and back to P.) As is true in its companion games, the trust game rarely
results in the uncooperative, untrusting Nash equilibrium of no money being
sent in either direction. Rather, positive amounts are usually sent and
reciprocated, with the mean and median being around half of the total.20
The unmistakable implication of these results to behavioral economists
has been that individuals are endowed with social preferences, not with the
atomistic, self-concerned preferences traditionally assumed in economics.2'
"Full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the other" 22 reveals that the
other places some weight on the utility of the self (and vice versa). Nash's
bargaining solution is transformed:
(1 + 21 2u 2 - BATNA,).(u 2 + 2 1u1 - BATNA 2 ),
with A.i representing the weight player i places on player j's utility. Although
such weights are an idea with deep roots in economics going back to Adam
Smith and Alfred Marshall, it is only recently that formal other-concern has
moved from the margins to a central object of study.23
Behavioral game theorists have rediscovered the importance and
malleability of intentions. A willingness to trust the other party and the
evaluation of an offer as fair depend critically on our perception of the other's
intentions.24 In the trust game, for example, if player P publicly forgoes a
lucrative option, receiver R is much more likely to be generous than if P had
no choice.25 The reason, of course, is that R credits P with good intentions in
the first case but not in the second. The utility weight, A2, is negative if
player j has bad intentions and deserves to be punished, but it is positive if
playerj is credited with good intentions and deserves to be rewarded.
The perception of intentions, like all perceptions, is ultimately subjective.
It is influenced by the personality of the perceiver, the particulars of the social
20. Id.; Kevin A. McCabe et al., Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form
Bargaining, 24 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 10 (1998).
21. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Llndarstan;hng ,cial .... .,er-ces with Simple Tests,
117 Q. J. EcON. 817 (2002); David Sally, A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social
Interaction, With an Application to the Prisoners'Dilemma, 39 SOC. SCI. INFO. 567 (2000).
22. Nash, supra note 2.
23. See ALFRED MARSHALL, THE EARLY ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF ALFRED MARSHALL, 1867-
1890 (1975); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Claredon Press 1976) (1790).
For a review of the history, see Sally, supra note 21.
24. Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 1281 (1993); Sally, supra note 21.
25. Kevin A. McCabe et al., Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games, 52 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 267 (2003).
2004]
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interaction, and the norms and rules of the greater society. One measure of
personality is social values orientation, which is disclosed through a series of
outcome choices involving various payoffs for self and other.26 Those who
are identified as "prosocial" in this test tend to be more cooperative in a
27variety of games and are more productive in integrative negotiations. More
importantly, if the players are physically or psychologically close, prosocial
behavior is much more likely.28 The chance to make eye contact, co-presence
in a room, shared opinions and attitudes, similarity of appearance and tastes,
positive mood and affection all make trust more likely and reliably boost
A.i .29 One study of the trust game allowed participants to meet each other and
identify commonalities before choosing, and these participants sent
significantly larger offers than did the anonymous, distant subjects of other
experiments. 30  Finally, the norms of society serve as a basis for the
perception of intentions and the appropriate ways to react to benign or malign
intent. A trust game played across segments of Israeli society discovered that
all segments were equally unlikely to trust a receiver whose family emigrated
from Africa or Asia. 31 Despite the fact that these Israelis remitted as large a
proportion as did those whose families originated in America or Europe, they
were entrusted with, on average, only half of the amount that the "Western"
Israelis were, and far more "Easterners" than "Westerners" were given
nothing at all. The most parsimonious explanation is that the norm in Israel
considers "Easterners," wrongly, to be unreliable and ungenerous.
That economists have finally recognized social preferences may be
greeted by negotiation researchers with a chorus of "it's about time" and "so
what?" Nevertheless, this belated "discovery" does present some challenges
and opportunities, if only to respond to economists' innate desire to model
and measure as much as they can. Clearly, the process of negotiation may
alter social preferences and raise or lower Aij: the questions are, how much?
how often? at what cost? For example, schmoozing can be thought of as the
exchange of trivial personal information with the goal to find salient and
26. D.M. Messick & C.G. McClintock, Motivational Basis of Choice in Experimental Games, 4
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1968).
27. Carsten K.W. De Dreu et al., Influence of Social Motives on Integrative Negotiations: A
Meta-Analytic Review and Test of Two Theories, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 889 (2000).
28. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator
Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653 (1996); Janice Nadler, Rapport in Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 875 (2004); Sally, supra note 21.
29. The complete argument including connections to the literature in social and cognitive
psychology is contained in Sally, supra note 21.
30. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 116 Q. J. ECON. 811 (2000).
31. C. Fershtman and U. Gneezy, Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental
Approach, 116 Q. J. ECoN. 351 (2001).
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public similarities that, in turn, will foster trust (e.g., "You were in Des
Moines last week? Oh, my cousin's best friend's mother is from there.")
How much value is there in schmoozing, physical co-presence, familiarity,
and other factors that narrow social distance?
32
Because we actively, and sometimes unconsciously, participate in the
preservation of our perceptions and preferences, situations of great conflict
and social distance are especially troublesome. We perceive our enemies to
be evil, distant, strange, unapproachable, unfamiliar, distasteful, and
unknowable.33 Moreover, we actively resist any evidence to the contrary.
Hence, productive negotiations must take a great deal of time, and the process
will necessarily have to decrease social distance slowly and imperceptibly.
Finally, there is renewed emphasis on the active management and
manipulation of intentions. The following tactics are examples: letting the
other side know that a valuable option was foresworn in order to bargain,
demonstrating good faith by sharing information early on, apologizing for any
wrongs perceived as intentional or excusing them as inadvertent errors,34 and
watching your wallet when someone is overaggressive about narrowing social
distance.
D. Networks
The existence of social preferences means that friends will negotiate quite
differently than strangers, and strangers who share a common acquaintance or
know of each other will bargain differently than two completely disconnected
individuals. Such network effects are yet another area of activity within game
theory. Although networks have been extensively studied by sociologists,
game theory's value added has been to develop strategic models of network
formation and examine the tradeoff between individual incentives and overall
network value.35 Here, in these models, players are nodes and their primary
decisions involve whether to create a connection with another player.
32. See Nadler, supra note 28.
33. D. Sally, Into the Looking Glass: Discerning the Social Mind Through the Mindblind, 18
ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 99 (2001).
34. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Apology in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 665
(2004).
35. Some of the most well-known works in sociology are K.S. Cook & R.M. Emerson, Power,
Equity, and Commitment in Exchange Networks, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 721 (1978); K.S. Cook et al., The
Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results, 89 AM. J. SOC. 275
(1983); B. Markovsky et al., Power Relations in Exchange Networks, 53 AM. Soc. REV. 220 (1988);
NETWORK EXCHANGE THEORY (David Wilier ed., 1999). For a comprehensive survey of network
game theory, see M.O. Jackson, A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency,
in GROUP FORMATION IN ECONOMICS: NETWORKS, CLUBS AND COALITIONS (G. Demange and M.
Wooders eds., forthcoming).
2004]
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Network stability is, roughly, an extension of the Nash equilibrium-a
network of connections is stable if no player wishes to erase a connection, and
there are no unmade connections that would benefit one player without
hurting another. Depending on the benefits and costs arising from
connections, very different structures will be stable (e.g., a circle with each
player linked to two others, or a star with every other player linked only to a
central person).3 6 In theory, players may form stable networks that leave a lot
of socially profitable connections unmade.
As we have seen throughout this essay, the equilibria in theory are often
not manifest in practice. One experiment that explicitly tested network theory
found that very few participant groups were able to spontaneously and
voluntarily organize themselves into a star network, a structure that results in
a lower payoff for the central player.3 7 Note that this difficulty arose in
anonymous groups: It would be very valuable to learn how a richer social
context-prior social ties, status, and reduced social distance-might alter the
network.
Another approach to network analysis is embodied by sociology's
network exchange theory which fixes the network structure and then tests how
resources flow across the available links.38  In bargaining terms, each
connected pair of players is engaged in a simple distributive negotiation. The
fixed structure creates varying BATNAs among the nodes since some players
have only one possible trading partner, while others have two, three, or more.
The key result is that central players with poor BATNAs claim less value than
do peripheral players with better BATNAs.
Network game theory pushes and pulls negotiation research. The push is
two-fold: First, to consider macro-social variables such as network structure
and centrality and their effects in bargaining situations; second, and more
importantly, to allow negotiators in theory and empirical work to choose their
partners. Network formation could and should be studied in negotiations.39
The pull is simple: Network research thus far has utilized the most minimal of
36. V. Bala and S. Goyal, A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, 68 ECONOMETRICA
1181 (2000).
37. A. Falk and M. Kosfeld, It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Zurich).
38. See supra note 35. For an economics example, see G. Charness & M. Corominas-Bosch,
Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Universitat Pompeu Fabra).
39. For two early efforts along this path, see R. Larrick & G. Janicik, Social Network Schemas
and the Learning of Incomplete Networks (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Duke
University); D.F. Sally & K.M. O'Connor, The Psychology of Entrepreneurship: Spanning the
Structural Hole in Network Research (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Cornell
University).
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negotiations-anonymous, distributive bargaining. Negotiation researchers
know a great deal about testing richer social contexts and more complicated
negotiations, and both of these elements would be extremely valuable
additions to network game theory.
This essay, ultimately, concerns network formation. There ought to be a
connection: A stronger link between negotiations and behavioral game theory
would result in fruitful cross-fertilization not only in networks but also in
strategic sophistication, learning, and social preferences.
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